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Abstract. In this paper we show that a recently proposed fragile watermarking scheme by Rawat et al. does not 
detect and localize tampering, therefore cannot be used for authentication applications. The problem lies in that the 
scheme embeds an authentication code into the LSBs of pixels without taking into consideration the image content. 
To overcome this issue the authentication should be combined with the first seven bits of the image pixels, and in 
this paper a revision in this sense is proposed. 
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1.  Introduction 
These days witnessed the predominance of digital 
images thanks to the development of affordable digital 
cameras and high-speed Internet. Nevertheless, 
concerns with respect to the origin and integrity of 
digital images have raised and received increasing 
attention since their content can be easily manipulated 
and edited. 
The study of fragile image watermarking aims at 
addressing these issues by answering questions about 
the authenticity of digital images, localization of the 
tampered areas and, in some cases, the capacity to 
recover them. In order to achieve these goals, a fragile 
watermark (which cannot survive to any content 
alterations) is embedded into the image. 
In the last years numerous image authentication 
techniques have been devised in pixel domain [1, 2] and 
transform domain, e.g., the Karhunen-Loève transform, 
[3, 4]. Soft computing techniques [5] have been 
extensively used to improve the efficiency of the 
watermarking schemes [6-8]. 
Security of the watermarking schemes [9-12] is 
another important feature resulting from applications 
where there exist adversaries willing to bypass 
watermarking properties such as copyright and integrity 
protection. 
The outline of this paper is as follows: in the next 
section, we briefly review several concepts of the chaos 
theory. In section 3, we describe the unsecure fragile 
watermarking scheme proposed by Rawat et al. [8] 
while in section 4 we present our attack and other 
remarks on the scheme. Section 5 concludes this paper. 
2.  Background 
Prior to describing the fragile watermarking 
algorithm introduced by Rawat et al. [8], we firstly 
present its main feature, the chaotic maps. 
2.1. Chaotic maps 
Chaotic maps, such as the Arnold cat map and the 
logistic map, are widely used for encryption and data 
hiding applications since they provide a high sensitivity 
to initial conditions [5]. 
The Arnold cat map is a two-dimensional invertible 
map which simply illustrates the principles of chaos. 
For instance, if the Arnold cat map is applied on an 
image I of size ݉ × ݊  then its pixel positions are 
randomized by the following relation: 
൤݌௜ሺݔ + 1ሻ݌௜ሺݕ + 1ሻ൨ = 
൤1 ߙߚ ߙߚ + 1൨ ∙ ൤
݌௜ሺݔሻ
݌௜ሺݕሻ൨mod	݊ = ∆ ൤
݌௜ሺݔሻ
݌௜ሺݕሻ൨ 	mod	݊       (1)
where 0 ൑ ݅ ൑ ݊ െ 1 , ݌௜ሺݔሻ and ݌௜ሺݕሻ  denote the 
coordinates ሺݔ, ݕሻ of the pixel ݌௜ , mod is the modulo 
operator, ߙ  and ߚ  are two positive integers that 
characterize the phase space, and detሺ∆ሻ = 1. 
Due to the restriction imposed to the parameters ߙ 
and ߚ, the Arnold cat map becomes periodic, i.e., if the 
pixel ݌௜ at location ሺݔ, ݕሻ returns to its original position 
after applying ܶ times the Arnold map, then the chaotic 
map has period ܶ . It is worth to point out that the 
period of the map is closely related to parameters ߙ and 
ߚ, and to the size of the image. 
Another instance of the chaotic maps is the logistic 
map, which is obtained by the following relation: 
݌௜ሺݔ + 1ሻ = ߤ݌௜ሺݔሻሺ1 െ ݌௜ሺݔሻሻ          (2) 
where 0 ൏ ߤ ൑ 4 . If 3.5699456 ൏ ߤ ൑ 4 , then the 
logistic map becomes chaotic. In this state, the 
sequences generated have a high sensitivity to the 
initial conditions. 
Rawat et al. [8] algorithm makes use of the Arnold 
cat map to shuffle the pixel positions of the host image, 
and of the logistic map to encrypt the watermark 
sequence. 
3.  A chaotic system based fragile watermarking 
scheme 
The fragile watermarking scheme proposed by 
Rawat et al. [8] can be summarized as follows: 
E1. By employing the Arnold cat map k times, 
shuffle the host image Ih, of size ݉ × ݊ , to 
obtain the image Is. 
E2. Split each pixel of Is into 8-bits planes. 
E3. By means of a logistic map create a chaotic 
sequence ܥ, of the same size as Ih. Further, the 
values of ܥ are rounded off to obtain an integer 
chaotic sequence. 
E4. Compute the binary chaotic watermark ௖ܹ as: 
௖ܹ = ܹ⨁ܥ    (3) 
where ܹ represents the original watermark and 
⨁ denotes the Boolean exclusive-or operation. 
E5. Substitute the LSB of each pixel of Is with the 
bits of ௖ܹ. 
E6. To obtain the watermarked image Iw apply the 
Arnold cat map ܶ െ ݇ times, where ܶ denotes 
the period of the chaotic map. 
A block diagram illustration of the embedding 
process is presented in Fig. 1. 
 
Fig. 1. The embedding procedure. 
The process of extracting the watermark is as 
follows: 
D1. Shuffle the watermarked image Iw, via the 
Arnold cat map ݌ times to obtain Iws. 
D2. Split each pixel of Iws into 8-bits planes. 
D3. As done in the embedding process, generate 
the chaotic sequence ܥ and round off each of 
its values. 
 
Fig. 2. The watermark extraction and verification 
procedures. 
D4. To recover the watermark the XOR operation 
is applied between the LSBs of Iws and the 
chaotic sequence ܥ. 
A block diagram illustration of the extraction and 
verification procedures is presented in Fig. 2. 
To localize the tampered regions, within the 
watermarked image Iw, perform the absolute difference 
between the original and the extracted watermark, 
followed by the Arnold cat map ܶ െ ݇ times. 
4. The proposed attack 
The security analysis adopted follows a cryptanalytic 
approach: the watermarking algorithm is assumed to be 
public while the security relies only on the Arnold cat 
map and the chaotic sequence which are used to 
watermark the media contents. The adversary, using the 
devised attack, will aim to tamper the integrity of the 
watermarked content without leaving any traces and 
thus circumventing the watermarking verification 
procedure. 
Before describing our attack, we make some 
observations on this scheme. 
Firstly, note that the Arnold cat map, which is 
employed in step E1, only changes the pixels position 
(i.e., the ሺݔ, ݕሻ coordinates) of the host image Ih. For 
instance, the effect of applying the Arnold cat map, with 
ߙ = ߚ = 1, ݇ = 5, on a 4 × 4 matrix is shown in Fig. 
3. Therefore the 8-bits planes of each pixel remain 
unchanged, even if the pixel's position is shuffled by the 
chaotic map. 
Secondly, the algorithm does not employ any 
interdependency between the bit planes of the marked 
pixels. 
 
 
Fig. 3. Illustration of the Arnold cat map (ߙ = ߚ = 1, ݇ = 5) on a 4 × 4 matrix. In the parenthesis are given the pixels 
positions before (black color) and after (red color) employing the chaotic map. 
The key observation of the attack is to compare steps 
(E1‒E5) and (D1‒D4) to reveal the fundamental flaw of 
the algorithm. In step E5, only the LSBs of the shuffled 
pixels are changed independently with those of the 
chaotic watermark, without considering the image 
content [9, 11]. In step D4, in order to assess the 
integrity of the suspicious image, the LSBs are extracted 
from the shuffled pixels. Therefore, we can tamper the 
watermarked image, while preserving the integrity of 
the watermark, using the following mechanism: 
A1. In a matrix L, store the LSBs of all the pixels of 
the watermarked image Iw. 
A2. Alter the pixels of the watermarked image Iw as 
desired. 
A3. In order to reinsert the watermark, replace the 
LSB of each pixel with those stored in the 
matrix L. 
In other words the attack may be restated as: freely 
alter all the watermarked image bit-planes apart the one 
of the LSBs. 
 
 
Fig. 4. (a) Host image (b) Watermarked image (c) Watermark image (d) Watermarked tampered image (e) Recovered 
watermark (identical to (c) even if image tampered). 
We have verified the attack experimentally: an 8 
bpp gray-scale image of size 256 × 256 pixels, taken 
from the OPTIMOL image collection [3], was chosen 
as the host image. As in [8], the watermark was a 
binary logo image of size 256 × 256  pixels. 
Furthermore, we set up the parameters of the Arnold 
cat map and logistic map to the values specified in 
[8], respectively ߙ = ߚ = 1, ݇ = 75, ߤ = 3.854 and 
݌ሺ0ሻ = 0.654. 
The result after applying [8] on the host image is 
given in Fig. 4b, while Fig. 4d shows the tampered 
image. The tampered image is obtained by placing a 
dark quadrant of size 50 × 50 pixels. All the LSBs of 
the pixels within the quadrant are left unchanged 
while the remaining bits are set to 0. Anyway, the 
watermark can still be extracted, as reported in Fig. 
4e. As an extreme example, we tampered the 
watermarked image by setting to 0 all bits leaving 
unaltered only the LSB of every pixel (see Fig. 5a). 
Also in this case, the watermark can be extracted as 
shown in Fig. 5b. 
 
Fig. 5. (a) Watermarked tampered image (b) Recovered 
watermark. 
5. Proposed revision and discussion 
To solve the presented security issue, a part of the 
authentication should contain information derived 
from the first seven bit-planes of the image pixels. For 
example, for each pixel Pi the bit to be substituted to 
its LSB could be derived by xor-ing the watermark bit 
in ௖ܹ  with the bits resulting from a Message 
Authentication Code (e.g. HMAC) computed from a 
key ݇  (which may be used also for the Arnold cat 
map) and a concatenation of: 
• the 7 MSBs of ݌௜ (i.e. all the pixel's bits, except 
the one that will be substituted); 
• the coordinates ݔ and ݕ of ݌௜. 
During the embedding process the new LSB of the 
pixel ݌௜ may be expressed as: 
LSB =
݌ܽݎ݅ݐݕ ቀ ௖ܹሺ݅ሻቚܯܣܥ௞൫ሺ݌௜		AND		0xFEሻ	|	ݔ	|	ݕ	൯ቁ, 
(4) 
where 0xFE  is a binary mask expressed in 
hexadecimal form, the symbol | means concatenation, 
ݔ and ݕ denote the pixel position, and ݌ܽݎ݅ݐݕሺܤሻ is a 
function that returns 0 if the number of ones in the 
binary representation of ܤ is even, and 1 otherwise. 
In this way the authentication bit in the LSB of every 
pixel depends on the pixel value, on the pixel position 
and on a secret key, thwarting the presented attack. 
6.  Conclusion 
In this paper we proved that the fragile 
watermarking scheme, based on two chaotic maps, 
proposed by Rawat et al. [8] is not secure, and 
therefore cannot be used to assess the authenticity and 
integrity of digital images. 
Moreover, we have proposed a solution to the 
problem, resulting in a more secure fragile 
watermarking algorithm. 
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